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YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.: 
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO THE RESCUE? 
WILLIAM R. CORBETT

 
ABSTRACT 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 can be interpreted in two 
obvious ways: one interpretation requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for pregnant employees, and the other does not require 
such accommodations. In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that in some cases employees may be able to prove 
intentional pregnancy discrimination based on an employer’s failure to 
make accommodations for the pregnant employee when the employer 
makes accommodations for other disabled employees. Rather than 
reaching this result by interpreting the statute to require reasonable 
accommodations, however, the Court held that plaintiffs with “indirect 
evidence” of discrimination may prove their claim using the pretext 
analysis developed by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 
Under this analysis, the Court instructed that, after the first two stages of 
the analysis, a plaintiff could attempt to prove that the employer’s 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying an accommodation for a 
pregnant employee is pretextual, and this could be proven by 
demonstrating the significant and unjustified burden the employer’s 
nonaccommodation policy imposes on pregnant employees. Although it 
seems that the Court resorted to McDonnell Douglas as a compromise to 
fashion a majority opinion, this essay contends that invocation of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis was neither necessary nor prudent. There 
are two likely ramifications of the Court’s use of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis. The first is that the Young opinion is likely to resurrect the 
division of intentional discrimination claims between those based on direct 
evidence and those based on circumstantial evidence, with the claims in 
those two categories being analyzed differently. That is a distinction that 
the Court rejected in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. Second, the 
Court’s resort to the McDonnell Douglas analysis refortifies a proof 
framework which arguably should not have survived the Desert Palace 
 
 
   Visiting Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; Frank L. Maraist and Wex S. 
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Professors Michael J. Zimmer and Charles Sullivan for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
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Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1684 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1683 
 
 
 
 
decision and which has constrained the robust development of employment 
discrimination law by forcing evidence in most cases into proxy questions 
or categories that have only a tangential relationship to the ultimate issue 
of discrimination. Too many claims in employment discrimination law are 
forced into the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which often serves to 
obscure the actual issues presented. Neither of the foregoing potential 
ramifications is a good development for employment discrimination law. 
Young v. UPS could—and should—have been resolved without resort to 
McDonnell Douglas. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
1
 the Supreme Court confronted 
the meaning of pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).
2
 Specifically, the Court was called 
upon to decide whether an employer intentionally discriminated against a 
pregnant employee when that employer made accommodations in the form 
of temporary job reassignments for other employees who were temporarily 
unable to perform their jobs due to on-the-job injuries, disabilities covered 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act, or loss of certification, but did not 
offer any such reassignment to a pregnant employee who was disqualified 
from performing her job as a driver due to lifting restrictions. The case 
seemingly required the Court to interpret the meaning and relationship of 
the two clauses of the PDA.
3
 The Court appeared to be put to the choice of 
two viable statutory interpretations—one that would require employers in 
some circumstances to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant 
 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2679 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(2012)).  
 3. The two clauses are separated by a semicolon. The first clause seemingly treats pregnancy 
discrimination as nothing more than a subset of sex discrimination, which would not encompass a duty 
on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations for pregnant employees. The second 
clause, on the other hand, seemingly requires something more than nondiscrimination on the basis of 
sex. The second clause can be interpreted as imposing a duty of reasonable accommodation because it 
states that pregnant employees are to be accorded the same treatment as a group of nonpregnant 
employees who have abilities and disabilities similar to those of pregnant employees. The PDA 
provides as follows:  
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, because of 
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/10
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employees if they provide them to similarly situated nonpregnant 
comparators, and one that would treat pregnancy as merely a subset of sex 
discrimination and would not require reasonable accommodation 
regardless of the employer’s accommodation of other similarly disabled 
nonpregnant employees. Remarkably, the Court did not approve either of 
these viable statutory interpretations. Yet it still found a way to vacate the 
summary judgment that had been granted in favor of the employer and 
remand the case. Eschewing the most likely statutory interpretations,
4
 the 
Court was rescued by invoking the much-maligned
5
 pretext proof 
framework developed in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
6
 
The 6–3 decision by the Court in Young crafts a middle-ground, 
compromise analysis to keep alive a pregnant plaintiff’s opportunity to 
prove intentional discrimination. It appears that in order to garner the 
votes for a majority opinion, the Court found it necessary to summon the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, which requires compartmentalizing 
evidence of discrimination in a three-stage burden-shifting proof structure 
for which each part and the whole is only loosely related to the ultimate 
issue of discrimination. The majority’s opinion likely will result in 
pregnancy accommodation claims surviving summary judgment and 
getting to the fact finder in numerous cases,
7
 and consequently may 
prompt employers to grant accommodations for pregnancy to avoid 
protracted litigation.
8
  
 
 
 4. The Court stated that it was opting for a third interpretation by imposing McDonnell 
Douglas. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353 (“The statute lends itself to an interpretation other than those that 
the parties advocate and that the dissent sets forth.”). 
 5. The criticism of McDonnell Douglas has been ongoing and escalating for many years. See, 
e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 
(1995); Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: 
McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511 (2008); Stephen 
W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 
LAB. LAW. 371 (1997). 
 6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 19–26.  
 7. A court already has relied on Young in this way. About a week after Young was decided, a 
federal district court denied the City of New York’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in a case based on 
failure to accommodate a pregnant employee, stating that the Supreme Court “recently dispelled any 
doubt that a plaintiff may bring a PDA claim based on her employer's failure to accommodate her 
pregnancy.” LaSalle v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 5109 (PAC), 2015 WL 1442376, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015). 
 8. See Ann C. McGinley, Young v. UPS, Inc.: A Victory for Pregnant Employees?, HAMILTON 
AND GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Mar. 29, 2015), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-blog-ann-mcginley-young-
v-ups-inc-a-victory-for-pregnant-employees/. 
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There is much fodder for discussion in the various opinions in Young.
9
 
The most discussed issue in the case may prove to be the Court’s apparent 
merger of disparate treatment and disparate impact under the third prong 
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
10
 although the Court appears to have 
adequately cabined its analysis to the small number of pregnancy 
discrimination claims that are wedged between the two clauses of the 
PDA.
11
 Indeed, the interaction of disparate treatment and disparate impact 
is an issue that has occupied the Court’s attention in some recent cases, 
including most conspicuously in 2009 in Ricci v. DeStefano.
12
 
I wish to address neither the likely effect of the decision on pregnancy 
accommodation nor the majority’s putative blending of disparate treatment 
and disparate impact. Rather, I will examine what may be the larger 
ramifications for employment discrimination law of the majority’s flying 
in McDonnell Douglas to provide the rescue as a compromise rationale for 
the Young decision. It is unfortunate that the Court resorted to the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis to achieve this result. The Court suggested 
that the analysis it crafted likely was limited to the PDA context,
13
 and 
even in that context, may be needed for only a short period of time.
14
 
Although the Court’s variation on the McDonnell Douglas analysis for 
accommodation claims under the PDA may be supplanted by an analysis 
under the ADA Amendments Act, as the Young majority suggested, the 
Court’s resort to the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is not likely to 
be insignificant or short-lived.  
Contrary to the Court’s assurances regarding the limited significance of 
the decision, invoking McDonnell Douglas to resolve whether the PDA 
imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation will likely have two 
negative ramifications for the larger body of employment discrimination 
law. First, the Court’s use of the pretext analysis will probably rejuvenate 
the vexatious distinction between employment discrimination claims based 
on direct evidence and those based on circumstantial or indirect 
 
 
 9. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Breyer. Justice Alito wrote a concurring 
opinion, and Justice Scalia wrote the principal dissent, with Justice Kennedy also filing a dissenting 
opinion. 
 10. See infra text accompanying note 63.  
 11. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355 (“This approach, though limited to the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act context . . . .”). 
 12. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 13. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355. 
 14. The Court suggested that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, as interpreted by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), may cover such cases arising after the effective date 
of that Act. Id. at 1348. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/10
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evidence.
15
 That distinction is one the Court said it was laying to rest in 
2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.
16
 Second, the Court has refortified 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, which arguably should not have 
survived Desert Palace.
17
 This proof framework, which requires that all 
evidence of discrimination be crammed into three categories, regardless of 
the suitability or fit, was featured by the Court in Young as a way to 
resolve a hard question in employment discrimination law. Neither of 
these likely ramifications will be a positive development in employment 
discrimination law, returning the law to nettlesome issues that should have 
been resolved in Desert Palace. The Court should be retiring McDonnell 
Douglas rather than invoking it as the panacea for hard issues. If I am 
correct about the legacy of Young, we will rue the day that the Court 
unnecessarily summoned McDonnell Douglas to the rescue.    
II.  PRELUDE TO YOUNG V. UPS: FROM MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO 
DESERT PALACE  
Much of the development of federal employment discrimination law in 
the courts and many of the Supreme Court’s employment discrimination 
opinions have focused on the proof structures used to analyze individual 
disparate treatment claims.
18
 The Supreme Court created two proof 
frameworks to analyze such claims. The Court first announced the pretext 
framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
19
 in 1973. The 
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is a three-part proof structure with 
shifting burdens of production. A plaintiff bears the initial burden of 
production to establish a prima facie case by proving (1) that he belongs to 
a protected class, (2) that he applied for and was qualified for the job, 
(3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and (4) that the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants having the 
 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. The Court provided a primer on theories of discrimination in Young, explaining that disparate 
treatment is “a claim that an employer intentionally treat[s] a complainant less favorably than 
employees with the ‘complainant’s qualifications’ but outside the complainant’s protected class.” 
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345. The Court also explained two other theories of discrimination—disparate 
impact, based on discriminatory effects of a facially neutral employment practice in which intent or 
motive is not required, and “pattern-or-practice” (also known as systemic disparate treatment), based 
on proof of intentional discrimination as the employer’s standard operating procedure. Id.; see also 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explaining the differences 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact).  
 19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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plaintiff’s qualifications.20 The Court noted in McDonnell Douglas that the 
elements of the prima facie case will vary with different factual 
situations.
21
 If the plaintiff satisfies the burden of the prima facie case, the 
burden of production shifts to the defendant-employer to present a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
22
 Finally, if the 
employer satisfies its burden at the second stage, the burden of production 
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered reason is 
a pretext for discrimination.
23
  
The McDonnell Douglas opinion announced the proof structure, but the 
mechanics and meaning of the analysis were not fully developed at that 
time. The Court found it necessary to explain the meaning and procedural 
effect of the second and third stages of the analysis in several subsequent 
cases. These decisions include Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine,
24
 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,25 and Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc.
26
 The decisions helped to clarify the standards 
and burdens of proof under the pretext framework, but even these 
decisions did not make the pretext framework easily applicable in all 
employment discrimination cases. The Court eventually would develop a 
second framework for individual disparate treatment claims.  
The court announced this alternative proof structure, mixed motives, in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
27
 Whereas the pretext analysis by design 
 
 
 20. Id. at 802. 
 21. Id. at 802 n.13. 
 22. Id. at 802–03. 
 23. Id. at 804.  
 24. 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981) (explaining the defendant’s burden at stage two). 
 25. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext in a fully tried case). 
 26. 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext at summary judgment). 
The Supreme Court has never held that the pretext analysis is applicable to analyze ADEA cases, 
although it assumed so in Consolidated Coin Caterers, and lower courts have routinely applied it. See 
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (“In assessing claims of age 
discrimination brought under the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others, has applied some variant of 
the basic evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had occasion to 
decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the 
parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it.”). In addition, the Court seems to have approved 
the applicability of the pretext analysis to disability discrimination claims under the ADA. See 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003). The McDonnell Douglas framework is also 
commonly adopted by courts to analyze claims under state employment discrimination laws. See, e.g., 
Zaniboni v. Mass. Trial Court, 961 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (stating that the analysis 
applies to claims under Massachusetts employment discrimination law). Beyond employment 
discrimination law, the pretext analysis has been adopted to analyze other types of federal and state 
employment claims. See, e.g., Sabourin v. Univ. of Utah, 676 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying 
analysis to a retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Eagen v. Comm’n on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478, 487 & n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (recognizing adoption of 
pretext analysis for various types of state employment law claims). 
 27. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/10
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identifies “the real reason” for the employment decision and rejects other 
reasons as pretext, the mixed-motives proof structure acknowledges that 
an employer may have considered multiple factors in making the 
employment decision and that the discriminatory reason is only one of 
those factors. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality opinion and Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence applied different standards to the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case. The plurality held that the plaintiff must prove that the 
discriminatory factor was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, 
while Justice O’Connor and Justice White applied a “substantial factor” 
standard in their concurrences.
28
 The opinions agreed that if a plaintiff 
proved a prima facie case, the burden would shift to the employer to prove 
that it would have made the same decision even without considering the 
discriminatory reason.
29
 An employer that satisfied its burden on this 
affirmative defense would avoid liability under this framework.
30
 
After Price Waterhouse, most courts adopted the substantial factor 
standard of the concurring opinions as the controlling standard of 
causation in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.31 However, Congress 
responded by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which clarified and 
adjusted the mixed-motives proof structure.
32
 Congress codified 
“motivating factor” as the causation standard in the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case rather than “substantial factor.”33 Congress also changed the analysis 
of Price Waterhouse by providing that the same-decision defense is not a 
complete defense, thereby avoiding liability. Instead, liability is still 
 
 
 28. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id at 259 (White, J., concurring). It has been argued 
that the use of different causation terms by the plurality and O’Connor concurrence was not intended 
to create different standards of causation. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title 
VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 508 (2006). But see 
William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination: Does the Master Builder 
Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 699 n.75 (2010). The case 
from which the Court derived the analysis equated the two standards. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
 29. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246 & 258; id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 30. Id. at 258. 
 31. See, e.g., Palmer v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1544, 1548 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing the 
different causation standards in the plurality and concurrences and opting for “substantial factor”); see 
also Maya R. Warrier, Note, Dare to Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus Mixed-Motive 
Analysis in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 409, 414 (2008) 
(recognizing disagreement regarding the controlling standard, but stating that most courts opted for 
“substantial factor”). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
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imposed even if the employer satisfies its burden on the same-decision 
defense, but the defense limits the remedies that are available.
34
 
In the wake of Price Waterhouse and even after the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, courts grappled with determining which proof structure—pretext or 
mixed motives—to apply in any given case. Most circuits seized upon the 
dividing line cited by the O’Connor concurrence: cases in which there was 
direct evidence of discrimination were analyzed under mixed motives, and 
circumstantial evidence cases were analyzed under pretext.
35
 The courts of 
appeals developed various definitions and standards to distinguish direct 
from circumstantial evidence. An attempt to categorize the approaches of 
the various circuits labeled them the “classic approach,” the “animus plus 
approach” and the “animus approach.”36 The tests were confusing and 
uncertain—described by a court that sought to put an end to the distinction 
as “chaos” and a “morass.”37   
No matter how vexatious the dividing standard may have been, as long 
as courts maintained a basis to distinguish between cases to be analyzed 
under pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed motives, it was 
reasonable, though challenging, for courts to continue using the two proof 
structures, and a rich body of case law developed under them. However, 
the Supreme Court seemingly upset this order when it held in Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa that direct evidence is not required for a plaintiff to 
be entitled to a motivating factor jury instruction.
38
 With that, the Court 
erased the line separating the cases analyzed under pretext and those 
analyzed under mixed motives. The Court based its holding on the fact 
that the language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not say 
anything about the “motivating factor” standard being limited to direct 
evidence cases.
39
 Even Justice O’Connor, on whose Price Waterhouse 
concurrence the distinction was based, agreed that the 1991 Act had 
undermined the distinction.
40
 The Court declined to say whether 
elimination of the dividing line meant that all disparate treatment cases 
 
 
 34. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with no 
damages. 
 35. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 36. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the 
categories developed by First Circuit Judge Selya), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).   
 37. Id. at 851–53; see also Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination 
Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 663 (2000) (“[T]he 
various definitions raise the question whether the courts' attempts to draw bright-line tests between 
direct and circumstantial evidence are really helpful at all.”).  
 38. 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
 39. Id. at 99. 
 40. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/10
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were to be analyzed under the mixed-motives framework.
41
 The lower 
courts were left with no guidance for deciding which framework to apply 
in any given case. 
Desert Palace appeared to be a landmark development in the evolution 
of the proof frameworks both for what it clearly did and for what it could 
be read as implicitly doing. First, it expressly ended the division and 
analysis of employment discrimination claims based on the type of 
evidence (direct or circumstantial) on which they were based. This was a 
good development in employment discrimination law because the dividing 
line had proven to be chimerical. Second, Desert Palace could be read as 
inferentially displacing the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and 
leaving all individual disparate treatment claims to be analyzed under the 
statutory mixed-motives framework. Because Desert Palace did not 
establish a new basis of demarcation between cases to be analyzed under 
the two proof frameworks, some courts
42
 and commentators
43
 suggested or 
argued that the McDonnell Douglas framework was dead. Those 
arguments notwithstanding, the courts continued to use the pretext 
analysis, with most never mentioning that Desert Palace had erased the 
dividing line and thereby called into question the continuing viability of 
McDonnell Douglas.
44
 Moreover, many courts continued to refer to the 
pretext analysis as being for cases based on circumstantial evidence and 
the mixed-motives analysis for cases based on direct evidence, saying that 
when a plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence the case must be 
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The Fifth Circuit, for 
example, recently declared this division by identifying the two categories 
of evidence and the different analyses applicable to each in Etienne v. 
Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., although the court in a 
footnote mentioned some uncertainty about this dichotomy based on 
Desert Palace.
45
 Although it certainly was arguable that the pretext 
 
 
 41. In fact the Court said it would not say: “This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, 
§107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.” Id. at 94 n.1 (majority opinion).  
 42. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990–93 (D. Minn. 2003). 
 43. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 (2004); Melissa Hart, Subjective 
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 765-66 (2005); Jeffrey A. 
Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas 
and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-
Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003). 
 44. See, e.g., Johnson v. Maestri Murrell Prop. Mgmt., 555 F. App’x 309, 311–12 (5th Cir. 
2014); Hamilton v. Oklahoma City Univ., 563 F. App’x 597, 600–01 (10th Cir. 2014); Vaughan v. 
Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 158 F. App’x 205, 207 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 45. 778 F.3d 473, 475 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Marable v. Marion Military Inst., 595 F. 
App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2014).  
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analysis survived Desert Palace, the courts that insisted upon maintaining 
the direct-circumstantial evidence dividing line were flouting the Court’s 
decision in Desert Palace. However, perhaps they were simply ahead of 
their time, as the Court itself would rejuvenate the distinction in Young. 
III.  YOUNG V. UPS: FACTS AND COURT OPINIONS 
Young was an air driver for UPS, where she had worked since 1999. 
Air drivers take packages and letters delivered by air, load them onto their 
trucks, and deliver them. UPS had a requirement that all drivers must be 
able to lift and handle packages weighing up to seventy pounds and to 
assist with packages weighing up to 150 pounds. When Young became 
pregnant, she was restricted from lifting over twenty pounds for the first 
twenty weeks of her pregnancy and over ten pounds thereafter. UPS 
informed her that she could not work at her driver job as long as she was 
under the lifting restriction. Young unsuccessfully argued to be permitted 
to continue in her driver job (because other employees had offered to assist 
her with lifting) or to do a light-duty job temporarily during her 
pregnancy. UPS had made such accommodations for other employees in 
three scenarios. First, UPS offered temporary transfers to light-duty jobs 
for workers who suffered on-the-job injuries. Second, under the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement, UPS was required to give “inside 
jobs” to drivers who lost their certification by the Department of 
Transportation. Finally, UPS provided reasonable accommodations, 
including some job reassignments, for disabled employees pursuant to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. After Young’s request for 
accommodation was denied, she was placed on leave under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, and when that leave expired, she took extended leave 
without pay and lost her group medical coverage. 
Young filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging sex, 
race, and pregnancy discrimination.
46
 In her subsequent lawsuit, she 
asserted claims for sex, race, and disability discrimination.
47
 Young 
moved to dismiss voluntarily her race discrimination claim,
48
 and the trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on her 
disability and sex discrimination claims.
49
 Regarding the sex 
 
 
 46. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1338 
(2015). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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discrimination claims, the district court granted summary judgment, 
reasoning that she did not produce direct evidence of discrimination and 
that she could not establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework because she did not identify a similarly situated 
comparator who was treated more favorably.
50
  
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment. First, 
the court rejected the interpretation of the PDA’s second clause as 
requiring employers to treat pregnant workers the same as similarly 
disabled nonpregnant workers by granting the same accommodations. The 
Fourth Circuit characterized that interpretation of the PDA as creating an 
impermissible “most favored nation”51 status for pregnant employees.52 
The court refused to adopt a broad reading of the second clause, which 
would create a cause of action separate and distinct from a sex 
discrimination claim under section 703(a).
53
 Second, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected the comments of a supervisor as direct evidence of employer 
discriminatory motive.
54
 Finally, the court evaluated Young’s claim under 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework and held, as the district court 
had, that Young could not establish a prima facie case because she 
produced no evidence that similarly situated employees outside the 
protected class received more favorable treatment.
55
 The court did not find 
the other types of employees given temporary job reassignments to be 
appropriate comparators. 
The Supreme Court majority opinion considered two interpretations of 
the second clause of the PDA. It rejected UPS’s reading that the second 
clause does no more than define sex discrimination to include pregnancy 
discrimination because the first clause does that, and such an interpretation 
would render the second clause superfluous.
56
 The majority also rejected 
the broader reading espoused by Young because the majority agreed with 
the Fourth Circuit that Congress did not intend, in enacting the PDA, to 
 
 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 446. The term is borrowed from the lexicon of international trade, in which it describes 
“[a] method of establishing equality of trading opportunity among states by guaranteeing that if one 
country is given better trade terms by another, then all other states must get the same terms.” Most-
Favored-Nation Status, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008), available at 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Most-Favored-Nation+Status; see also Principles of the 
Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
(last visited June 11, 2015). 
 52. Young, 707 F.3d at 446. 
 53. Id. at 447. 
 54. Id. at 449. 
 55. Id. at 450. 
 56. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352–53 (2015). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1694 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1683 
 
 
 
 
create a “most-favored nation” status for pregnancy.57 Instead, the majority 
interpreted the second clause as permitting a plaintiff to prove a pregnancy 
discrimination claim with indirect evidence using the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis.
58
 The majority described the analysis as proceeding in the 
following way. First, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case by 
proving that she belongs to a protected class, she sought an 
accommodation, and the employer denied the accommodation, although it 
did accommodate others similarly able or unable to work. Next, the 
employer would give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying 
the accommodation, but that reason normally could not be that 
accommodating pregnant women was more expensive or less convenient. 
Finally, the plaintiff would prove the employer’s reason was pretextual, 
and a jury question could be created on this issue, by producing sufficient 
evidence that the employer’s policy actually imposes a significant burden 
on pregnant women—a burden which cannot be justified by the given 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and which permits an inference of 
discrimination.  Furthermore, the plaintiff can establish a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding imposition of a significant burden at stage three by 
presenting evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of 
nonpregnant employees and fails to accommodate a large percentage of 
pregnant employees.
59
  
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, did not rely on the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis to interpret the second clause, but instead 
offered an interpretation of the meaning of the second clause of the PDA 
that was also different from either of the two advanced by the parties. 
According to Justice Alito, an employer violates the second clause if it 
does not have a neutral business reason for treating pregnant employees 
differently than nonpregnant employees who are reassigned.
60
  
The dissent authored by Justice Scalia argued that the majority and the 
concurrence erred by not accepting UPS’s reading of the second clause of 
the PDA as adding nothing but clarity to the first clause, which simply 
defines pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.
61
 The 
dissent saw the second clause as capable of only the two interpretations 
advanced by the parties.
62
 Because the majority’s application of the 
 
 
 57. Id. at 1349. 
 58. Id. at 1353–54. 
 59. Id. at 1354–55. 
 60. Id. at 1359 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 1364. 
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McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis requires a court to evaluate the effect 
of the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the dissent 
characterized the approach as “allowing claims that belong under Title 
VII’s disparate-impact provisions to be brought under its disparate-
treatment provisions instead.”63 Justice Scalia’s dissent also took the Alito 
concurrence to task for its “text-free broadening” of the second clause.64 
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion expressed agreement with Justice 
Scalia’s dissent, which he joined, but also denounced indifference to the 
plight of pregnant women in the workforce.
65
 Kennedy’s dissent attempted 
to minimize the effect of interpreting the second clause of the PDA as 
Justice Scalia did by pointing out that there are other laws that may protect 
and assist working pregnant women, including the Family and Medical 
Leave Act and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
66
 The Kennedy dissent 
agreed with the Scalia dissent that the majority’s interpretation of the PDA 
risks conflating disparate treatment and disparate impact. Justice Kennedy 
added that the majority’s analysis “injects unnecessary confusion into the 
accepted burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas.”67 
IV.  CONFUSION ABOUT STATUTES, THEORIES AND PROOF STRUCTURES: 
WHEN IN DOUBT, LEAVE IT TO MCDONNELL DOUGLAS!  
Young v. UPS is, in part, a microcosm of the development of federal 
employment discrimination law and how it has gone awry. Fifty years ago, 
faced with statutes that provide bare-bones prohibitions of discrimination 
based on specified characteristics, the Supreme Court and lower courts 
embarked on a large-scale case law development that focused on 
articulating theories of discrimination and, within those theories, proof 
structures or frameworks.
68
 Recognizing the opinion’s place in that 
lineage, early in the opinion, the Young majority set out a short primer on 
three theories of discrimination: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and 
pattern or practice (more properly, systemic disparate treatment).
69
 The 
Court noted that Young alleged neither disparate impact nor pattern or 
 
 
 63. Id. at 1366.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1366–67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 1367–68. 
 67. Id. at 1368. 
 68. Many of the Supreme Court’s employment discrimination decisions have been about the 
proof frameworks used to prove and analyze disparate treatment and disparate impact. See supra Part 
II. 
 69. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345. 
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practice.
70
 The Court further explained that under the disparate treatment 
theory of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove discrimination either by 
direct evidence or by using the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
71
 which, 
while  technically correct, is misleading and unnecessary in light of the 
Court’s decision in Desert Palace in 2003. 
The Young majority flew in McDonnell Douglas to provide the rescue 
as a compromise rationale to fashion a majority opinion. Despite the 
majority’s unusual assurances that this modified McDonnell Douglas 
analysis would be limited in both scope and time of application,
72
 I think 
the invocation of McDonnell Douglas is by no means as innocuous as the 
majority suggests. Rather, the use of the pretext analysis reintroduces 
some vexing issues into employment discrimination law that should have 
been laid to rest in 2003, and it portends the continuing deployment of 
pretext analysis to resolve issues that do not belong in that framework, 
thereby stunting a more transparent and comprehensible development of 
employment discrimination law. First, it resurrects the problematic and 
once-rejected division between direct evidence and circumstantial 
evidence cases, even if under the new labels of direct evidence and 
indirect evidence (which likely is a distinction without a meaningful 
difference). Second, it once again elevates the role of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis in disparate treatment law, suggesting that almost any 
issue of discrimination, including particularly challenging ones, can be 
stuffed into the three-part framework. Thus, lower courts will take their 
cue to analyze most intentional discrimination cases under McDonnell 
Douglas, no matter how poor the fit between the case and the pretext 
framework. Neither of these probable results will be good for employment 
discrimination law.  
A. Did the Young Majority Forget or Ignore Desert Palace? 
In Young, the Court majority seemingly followed the lead of lower 
courts and forgot or ignored the holding of Desert Palace, declaring that 
“a plaintiff can prove disparate treatment either (1) by direct evidence that 
a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected 
characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas.”73 Later the Court states that “an individual pregnant 
 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See text accompanying supra notes 13–14. 
 73. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345. 
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worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence 
may do so through application of the McDonnell Douglas framework.”74 
How could the Young case be resolved this way twelve years after the 
Court decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa?
75
 The Court should have been 
aware it was contravening Desert Palace, as this was pointed out in an 
amicus brief filed by law professors and women’s and civil rights 
organizations.
76
 
In Desert Palace, the Court erased the dividing line between 
intentional discrimination cases relying on direct evidence and those based 
on circumstantial evidence by declaring that direct evidence is not required 
to bring a case under the mixed-motives framework.
77
 Since Desert 
Palace, many courts steadfastly and repeatedly have indicated that they do 
not understand that decision to have erased the direct 
evidence/circumstantial evidence dividing line in discrimination law.
78
 
Some courts seemingly have tried to give effect to Desert Palace while 
fashioning an only slightly different dichotomy from that rejected in 
Desert Palace. Such courts say that when no direct evidence exists, 
plaintiffs may prove their cases by using the McDonnell Douglas indirect 
method, but the direct method requires plaintiffs to show the employer’s 
illegal motive through either direct or circumstantial evidence.
79
 Thus, 
those courts shifted from speaking of direct and circumstantial evidence to 
direct and indirect methods, while also incorporating the two kinds of 
evidence. Another analytic variation devised by some courts explains that 
the courts are not contravening Desert Palace because “direct” evidence is 
not the converse of circumstantial evidence.
80
 Suffice it to say that lower 
 
 
 74. Id. at 1353. 
 75. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 76. Brief of Law Professors and Women’s and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Young (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4536935. 
 77. See supra Part II. 
 78. See supra notes 44–45. 
 79. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012); Marich v. Sch. Town of 
Munster, Ind., No. 2:11-cv-96, 2015 WL 1865549, at *5-6 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 2015). 
 80. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit 
explained this approach as follows:  
Thus, “direct” refers to the causal strength of the proof, not whether it is “circumstantial” 
evidence. A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal discrimination motivated the 
employer's adverse action does not need the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to 
the jury, regardless of whether his strong evidence is circumstantial. But if the plaintiff lacks 
evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive, he must avoid summary 
judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination through the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext. 
Id.  
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courts, left with no basis to distinguish which disparate treatment cases get 
which analysis after Desert Palace, have tried different approaches that all 
approximate the pre-Desert Palace law. In doing so, the lower courts have 
facially, but not substantively, honored the holding of Desert Palace that 
the distinction between types of evidence does not determine the 
applicable analytical framework and is of little moment because direct 
evidence is not necessarily superior to circumstantial.
81
  
In Young, the current Court showed how little it respects the Desert 
Palace decision. The use of different terms raises the possibility that the 
Court in Young is not reviving the pre-Desert Palace dichotomy, but 
instead is trying to follow lower courts in establishing a new guide for 
determining how to analyze disparate treatment cases, based on a 
distinction between “direct” evidence and “indirect” evidence, that is 
somehow different from the old divide between direct and circumstantial 
evidence.
82
 This solution seems unlikely, and if that is what the Court was 
doing in Young, it did not make that clear. Moreover, adoption of such a 
new dichotomy would be troubling, because it would reintroduce nebulous 
standards used to make distinctions between amorphous categories of 
evidence that existed before Desert Palace. The putative new dichotomy 
would be as unfaithful to Desert Palace as would be reintroducing the 
circumstantial/direct dichotomy that Desert Palace abrogated.
83
 
Regardless of what the Court intended with its direct/indirect evidence 
distinction in Young, it likely resuscitated the importance of distinguishing 
between the different categories of evidence used to prove disparate 
treatment.  
B. Back to the Future: Young Reanimates McDonnell Douglas 
Over its forty-plus years, the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework 
has come under increasing criticism. The stage one prima facie case and 
the stage three pretext parts of the analysis have been exposed as artificial 
and not particularly probative of the ultimate question of discrimination.
84
 
The prima facie case has been discredited for its shifting and uncertain 
elements and its attenuated relationship to whether discrimination actually 
 
 
 81. In Desert Palace, the Court explained that circumstantial evidence is not necessarily inferior 
to direct evidence and, in some cases, circumstantial evidence is more persuasive than direct evidence. 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
 84. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let 
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 494–99 (2013).  
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occurred.
85
 The pretext stage has raised questions regarding its substantive 
and procedural meaning, requiring clarification from the Supreme Court in 
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks86 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc.
87
 As it has developed, the third stage proof of pretext has 
been less helpful in answering the ultimate question of discrimination than 
the analysis originally seemed to promise.
88
 Overall, the weakness of the 
framework is that it asks questions that may lead to a finding of 
discrimination, but the correlation between the analysis and the ultimate 
issue of intentional discrimination in any given case is tenuous.
89
 Beyond 
the problems with the analysis itself, the courts’ application of it has 
created additional problems. Rather than using the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis as a method of proof that is appropriate for some cases, the courts 
have come to treat it as a straightjacket into which the vast majority of 
disparate treatment claims must be forced, regardless of the fit.
90
 At its 
inception and in its early life, the Court did not intend for the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to be so used.
91
 
After Desert Palace, the Court left us with no way to allocate claims 
between pretext and mixed motives, and thus another reason to dispatch 
with the pretext analysis was added to the mounting criticisms of the aging 
framework. Young has negated the argument that Desert Palace implicitly 
eliminated the McDonnell Douglas analysis by erasing the type-of-
evidence dividing line. Moreover, in Young, the Court sent the message 
that hard questions of employment discrimination law can be resolved by 
 
 
 85. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 372–78 (describing the elements of the prima facie case as 
“moving targets” and criticizing the prima facie case as “only marginally related to the focus of the 
case”); see also Malamud, supra note 5, at 2282–2301 (discussing these and other problems with the 
prima facie case). The Supreme Court explained the rationale for inferring discrimination based on a 
prima facie case: If the two most common legitimate reasons for rejection of an applicant, lack of 
qualifications and lack of a vacancy, can be ruled out, an inference of discrimination is reasonable in 
the absence of other explanation. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 
(1977). 
 86. 509 U.S. 502, 509–11 (1993). 
 87. 530 U.S. 133, 146–49 (2000). 
 88. See Corbett, supra note 84, at 498–99. 
 89. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 94 
(2011) (explaining that “[e]mbedded within the McDonnell Douglas inquiry are several sets of facts 
that masquerade as legal standards”); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 
709, 711 (2002) (“[M]ost commentators agreed that the artificial nature of the McDonnell Douglas 
proof structure, especially its very light prima facie case, was the root of the problem.”). 
 90. See Corbett, supra note 84, at 501–05. 
 91. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“The method suggested in 
McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, however, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common 
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.”). 
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forcing them into the three stages of McDonnell Douglas. After Young, 
McDonnell Douglas is very much alive and well and commissioned to 
dominate disparate treatment analysis.  
The area of employment discrimination and the law regulating it 
present many hard questions. It seems that the Court and courts would 
better develop the law by addressing those hard questions rather than 
forcing them into a proof framework, composed of surrogate questions, 
which have little to do with the issue. To illustrate, on remand, the plaintiff 
in Young may win the case or lose it. The result will be based on whether 
the fact finder chooses to infer or not to infer discriminatory intent of the 
employer. Such results still will not tell employers, employees, lawyers, 
and courts whether employers that provide accommodations to other 
disabled employees must provide them to pregnant employees. Plaintiffs 
making such claims presumably will win some and lose some. The law is 
left unclear, and a jury’s finding of pretext or no pretext has little to do 
with the question presented. Making the issue of duty of accommodation a 
question of pretext is just that—a pretext. 
Young will empower courts to continue labeling cases as based on 
direct or indirect evidence, and then to force those labeled indirect into the 
pretext framework regardless of how poorly they fit into it.
92
 Young itself 
is not well described as a circumstantial or indirect evidence case. The 
employer provided temporary job reassignments to some employees 
temporarily unable to perform their jobs but not to pregnant employees 
rendered temporarily unable to perform because of pregnancy.
93
 Once the 
claim is forced into the pretext framework, it should be clear how inapt is 
the analysis.
94
 In reality, there is no issue of pretext. The Court says that at 
this stage, the plaintiff may prevail by “providing sufficient evidence that 
the employer's policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, 
and that the employer's ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not 
sufficiently strong to justify the burden,” which will permit the fact finder 
to infer intentional discrimination.
95
 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion 
characterizes the majority’s articulation of what would happen at stage 
three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an “ersatz disparate-impact 
 
 
 92. The McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is more troubling in this regard than the mixed-
motives analysis because the McDonnell Douglas series of surrogate questions is more restrictive than 
the more open-ended inquiry in the statutory mixed-motives framework—whether discrimination was 
a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.  
 93. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
 94. See McGinley, supra note 8 (discussing three reasons why McDonnell Douglas was not 
needed to analyze discrimination in the case).  
 95. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015). 
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test.”96 Perhaps. Whatever it is, it is not a showing of pretext because 
pretext has nothing to do with the facts of the case. 
The Young case is reminiscent of many other cases presenting 
challenging but clear questions regarding discrimination in which courts 
dutifully forced them into a proof framework, usually and overwhelmingly 
the McDonnell Douglas framework, and thus obscured the real issue. 
Consider for example, Burlington v. News Corp., a case in which a 
Caucasian news anchor was fired after his use of the word “n_ _ _ _ r” in a 
meeting to discuss whether the word should be used in a news report 
caused substantial racial unrest in the workplace.
97
 The Caucasian plaintiff 
contended that he was disciplined for a nonderogatory use of the word, 
while many black employees who also used the word were not 
disciplined.
98
 The court recognized the threshold question of which 
analysis it should apply—the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or 
mixed-motives.
99
 The court said it was using both analyses,
100
 but it posed 
the key question ostensibly under the pretext stage: “can an employer be 
held liable under Title VII for enforcing or condoning the social norm that 
it is acceptable for African Americans to say ‘[n _ _ _ _ r]’ but not 
whites?”101 Thus, the court identified the core discrimination issue in the 
case, one that merited careful consideration, but an issue that actually had 
little to do with the McDonnell Douglas analysis, although the court 
dutifully crammed it into the pretext stage. Examining that issue, the court 
concluded that African Americans indeed might tolerate use of the word 
by other African Americans and be insulted when the word is used by 
white people.
102
 Nevertheless, the court found that even if such a social 
norm exists, it was the type of discriminatory social norm that Title VII 
was enacted to counter.
103
 Burlington confronted an important 
discrimination issue and is an equally important holding, but the case had 
nothing to do with pretext.  
Burlington, like Young, is a case of comparative treatment. As in 
Young, it presents a challenging but clear question to be resolved under 
discrimination law, and it is a question that becomes less stark and 
comprehensible when buried in the McDonnell Douglas analysis under the 
 
 
 96. Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 97. 759 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 98. Id. at 593–94. 
 99. Id. at 590–91. 
 100. Id. at 591. 
 101. Id. at 596. 
 102. Id. at 597. 
 103. Id. 
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guise of pretext. The Court in Young suggested that it was doing little 
harm because its analysis may have a short life, as future cases of the type 
may be decided under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. However, the 
Court’s approach of burying hard questions within McDonnell Douglas 
will empower courts to be weak. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Young majority forgot the lessons of the past, and in so doing, it 
returned to the past. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins taught that the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is not appropriate to address all types of 
cases, and so the Court created the mixed-motives analysis. Desert Palace 
v. Costa taught that the distinction between direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence cases is not supported by the statutory language, 
but the Court did not explain what follows from eradicating that dividing 
line. Desert Palace should have announced the demise of McDonnell 
Douglas. Now in Young, the Court returns to the type-of-evidence 
dividing line and reinvigorates a proof framework that should have died.  
Unwilling to treat the case as presenting a question of statutory 
interpretation that could go either of two ways, the Court chose to force it 
into a proof structure. That was an unfortunate decision that obscured the 
issue. From there, the Court could have placed it under the mixed-motives 
analysis with its prima facie case standard of “motivating factor” and the 
remedy-limiting same-decision defense. That proof structure is established 
by statute, and it permits a more open-ended inquiry without forcing 
evidence into a series of surrogate questions in three stages. The Young 
Court could have done that because Desert Palace held that the mixed-
motives framework is not limited to cases involving direct evidence. 
Although not the best approach to resolving the case, the mixed-motives 
analysis would have permitted flexibility to discuss the relevant issues. 
Instead, McDonnell Douglas flew in to rescue the Court from having to 
answer a hard question of statutory interpretation. 
The Young majority opinion may please nostalgia buffs and McDonnell 
Douglas fans, but it is bad law. Although the Court suggests the decision 
will have limited effect, I think the Court is wrong. Young divides 
intentional discrimination claims based on labeling of evidence and 
fortifies McDonnell Douglas, and neither development is good for 
employment discrimination law. 
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